The lender of last resort and liquidity provision: How much of a departure is the sub-prime crisis? by Davis, EP
Department of  
Economics and Finance  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Working Paper No. 09-09 
 http://www.brunel.ac.uk/about/acad/sss/depts/economics
 
Ec
on
om
ic
s 
an
d 
Fi
na
nc
e 
W
or
ki
ng
 P
ap
er
 S
er
ie
s 
E Philip Davis  
 
The Lender of Last Resort and Liquidity 
Provision: How Much of a Departure is 
the Sub-prime Crisis? 
 
February 2009 
28th January 2009 
 
THE LENDER OF LAST RESORT AND LIQUIDITY 
PROVISION – HOW MUCH OF A DEPARTURE IS THE SUB-
PRIME CRISIS? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
E Philip Davis1 
Brunel University and NIESR 
London 
 
 
 
Paper presented at the Conference entitled “Regulatory Response to the Financial 
Crisis”, London School of Economics, 19th January 20092 
 
 
 
Abstract:  The traditional role of the lender of last resort (LOLR) is to avoid unnecessary 
bank failures that could threaten systemic stability, while ensuring that there are suitable 
safeguards for central bank balance sheets and that moral hazard is minimised. The sub-prime 
crisis has shown that traditional models of bank liquidity risk and of LOLR require revision, 
as was already apparent to a lesser extent in the Russia/LTCM episode. Funding risk now 
interacts with market liquidity risk, to create difficult challenges for central banks. Even in the 
relatively non-systemic period up to September 2008, the LOLR had to adapt radically, for 
example, in terms of lending to investment banks, taking lower quality collateral and lending 
for longer maturities. Central banks have also been challenged by difficulties in maintaining 
confidentiality of support and by the interaction of these problems with low levels of deposit 
insurance. Since September 2008, although action has mostly been in line with traditional 
approaches for systemic crises, there have been some further adaptations in line with the 
systemic nature of the crisis, notably by the Federal Reserve acting as market maker or 
investor of last resort in illiquid securities markets. 
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Introduction 
 
This paper seeks to assess the importance of liquidity in financial crises and how the 
authorities may deal with it. It starts from the concept of bank runs – whereby the nature of 
banking means that solvent banks may at times be subject to panic runs and consequent 
illiquidity – and their ubiquity in most crises to date. Contagion may arise via credit risk 
linkages to other banks. This is a problem of “funding liquidity”. It then considers the 
authorities’ response to crises in terms of lender of last resort (LOLR) – illustrated by 
historical examples – and evolving views of LOLR. Note that this “benchmark” is based on 
current beliefs and attitudes in central banks, academia and international organisations and not 
on the precise wording of key authors such as Bagehot. 
 
The paper then goes on to assess how liquidity problems during the current crisis have 
differed from the past. During this crisis the authorities have had to adapt their LOLR policy 
to a crisis which is not merely one of “funding liquidity” but also of “market liquidity” (IMF 
2008, Davis 1994), while contagion has occurred more via market prices and less via credit 
risk (Adrian and Shin 2008) and new “amplifiers” of financial instability have become 
apparent (Brunnermeier 2008). Even in the non-systemic3 period up to September 2008, the 
LOLR had to adapt radically, for example, in terms of lending to investment banks, taking 
lower quality collateral and lending for longer maturities. Central banks have also been 
challenged by difficulties in maintaining confidentiality of support and by the interaction of 
these problems with low levels of deposit insurance. Since September 2008, although action 
has mostly been in line with traditional approaches for systemic crises, there have been further 
adaptations in line with the systemic nature of the crisis, notably by the Federal Reserve 
acting as market maker or investor of last resort in illiquid securities markets. Meanwhile 
fiscal authorities have stepped into their traditional role in a systemic crisis of recapitalising 
potentially insolvent banks, this offering some relief to LOLRs. 
 
Readers already familiar with the basic models of liquidity and bank runs, and of the role of 
bank liquidity policies may wish to turn directly to Section 3; those also familiar with current 
views of lender of last resort might turn further to Section 4, while noting the distinction we 
make between the LOLR in non systemic periods (Sections 3.1-3.3) from LOLR in systemic 
crises (Section 3.4). 
 
1 Liquidity in financial crises 
 
Liquidity risk in general is the risk that an asset owner is unable to recover the full value of 
their asset when sale is desired, due to the transaction affecting the price (transactional 
liquidity). A further type of liquidity risk relates to the ease with which one can raise money 
by borrowing using an asset as collateral (funding risk). Liquidity risk of this type has always 
played a key role in banking crises. This section provides a benchmark against which to 
compare previous episodes to the sub-prime crisis.  
 
Bank assets – particularly loans – are by their nature illiquid and long term, and subject to 
imperfect information, while liabilities are mostly liquid and short term. These short-term 
liabilities are conceptually a means of disciplining bank managers via the threat of bank runs, 
as they help to ensure that bank managers take depositors’ interests into account by not taking 
                                                 
3 Whether the period August 2007-August 2008 was strictly non-systemic is of course contestable, but what is 
clear is that there was a step change in the intensity of the financial crisis in September 2008 which necessitated 
further and more radical measures of crisis management. 
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excessive risks in their choice of asset holdings (Kaufman 1988). But depositors’ monitoring 
of projects is likely to be prone to error, making banks vulnerable to “overdiscipline” (and 
possibly runs on solvent banks) leading to socially wasteful liquidation of projects. Owing to 
the fire sale problem – that is, the inability to realise assets at full value owing to asymmetric 
information – illiquid banks can rapidly become insolvent. 
 
Once one bank has experienced a run, there is the possibility of contagion, with runs on other 
banks. Depositors may react either to balance sheet similarities with the failed institution 
under uncertainty and asymmetric information (Morgan 2002), or to perceived counterparty 
exposures with the failed bank. Contagion could, in turn, impact on the wider economy via 
monetary contraction, or credit contraction owing to the difficulty individual borrowers may 
have in establishing new credit relations with a different financial institution when their bank 
fails (Freixas et al 2000a). Note, however, that widespread bank runs need not imply 
contagion. An alternative possibility, as was arguably the case with the banking crises in 
Scandinavia in the early 1990s, is that there is a macroeconomic shock of such magnitude that 
many banks become simultaneously insolvent. 
 
There are various models of bank runs. The best known is the Diamond and Dybvig (1983) 
model, in which banks provide liquidity insurance to risk averse depositors. Normally the 
demand for repayment by depositors is predictable, and can be catered for by a low level of 
liquid assets, however, if the bank is forced to sell its illiquid assets in a “fire sale”, then it 
may not realise sufficient cash to cover all of its deposits. Then some depositors may run, if 
they suspect other depositors will also do so, as they fear being last in the queue for cash (that 
is, there is a coordination problem). This pattern may lead to insolvency of a potentially sound 
institution. 
 
The Diamond-Dybvig model assumes that bank runs are purely random events. Alternatively, 
Chari and Jagannathan (1988) suggest that adverse information leads to panics – that is, 
systematic risks are inferred from what may be idiosyncratic. Jacklin and Bhattacharya (1988) 
focus on the role that information of depositors may have on the quality of bank assets. 
Gorton (1988) saw panics occurring mainly in recessions, which confirms the adverse 
information hypothesis, since panics occur close to the period when business failures are most 
widespread. 
 
Runs are traditionally assumed to take place among retail depositors, but large wholesale 
depositors are increasingly more important. Wholesale depositors are generally better 
informed and less likely to be covered by deposit insurance and (as discussed below) banks 
are increasingly dependent on wholesale funding. Wholesale funding is attractive to banks as 
a means to rapidly grow balance sheets. The interbank market is a key locus of runs in recent 
years, including, for example, the failures in the United States of Franklin National in 1974 
and Continental Illinois in 1984. 
 
The systemic importance of interbank markets has also been increased by recent trends in 
financial innovation. For example, there is a growing need for liquidity owing to growth in 
international trading and transactions – notably over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives can give 
rise to unexpected liquidity demands – and also of large value interbank payments systems 
using real time gross settlement (RTGS). Nevertheless, although there have been individual 
bank failures, the domestic interbank markets of the advanced countries have historically been 
fairly robust. 
 
The international interbank market, in contrast, has been a major focus of liquidity crises, as 
in the Asian Crisis of 1997. Bernard and Bisignano (2000) highlight a number of features of 
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the international interbank market that contribute to this. They include, first, the typical lack 
of security (collateral) and low levels of information gathering. These may in turn be linked to 
moral hazard via implicit guarantees by central banks for the interbank market’s functioning. 
The existence of the interbank market may also lead banks to underinvest in liquidity. A range 
of banks with low credit quality (as in East Asia up to the crisis of 1997) may operate in it so 
long as lenders believe the implicit guarantees. The international interbank market is typically 
subject to quantity and not price rationing of credit, due to low levels of information on credit 
risk. The short maturity makes withdrawal easy, and more generally, the market is vulnerable 
to sudden increases in credit rationing during periods of stress, as a result of adverse selection 
and moral hazard problems. These shortcomings give rise to a potential for contagion and 
global transmission of shocks.  
 
Theory has begun to catch up with this shift in importance from retail to wholesale runs.4 For 
example, Allen and Gale (2000) highlight the possibility that systemic risks in the interbank 
market can vary with the structure of creditor relations. Most risky is a structure with 
unilateral exposure chains among banks, while there is less risk of contagion when all banks 
lend to each other, as the effects of shocks are less concentrated. In between these two types 
of structures is a tiered structure of money centre banks on which other banks rely (Freixas et 
al 2000b). 
 
2 Liquidity policy of banks 
 
Banks can protect against liquidity risk. Most obviously this can be done by holding a 
significant proportion of liquid assets (a so-called net defensive position). Cash is then 
available to be used immediately to answer liquidity needs, while government securities can 
be used readily as collateral. However, banks seek to avoid holding liquid assets given the 
cost in terms of lower profitability, the low frequency of crises, limited liability of 
shareholders, and the safety net, as discussed below. There have been major declines in asset 
liquidity over recent decades, for example in the United Kingdom, banks’ liquid assets were 
30 per cent of the total in the 1950s, but today are only 1 per cent (Goodhart 2007, Bank of 
England 2008b). 
 
Banks can dissipate withdrawal risk by diversifying funding sources. This is liability 
management, which aims to ensure the continuity and cost effectiveness of funding 
(Greenbaum and Thakor 2007). There are three key issues. The first is to ensure enough 
diversification to reduce liquidity risk, among, for example, certificates of deposit (CDs), 
eurodollars, repurchase agreements (repos), subordinated debt and contingent credit facilities 
from other banks as well as interbank, time and demand deposits and contingent credit 
facilities from other banks. 5 Securitisation is a further instrument for liability management. 
The second is to ensure the appropriate mix of traditional deposits and investment products. 
Deposits typically incorporate services, have payoffs that are insensitive to the fortunes of the 
intermediary, are for small/uninformed users and are insured, so their demand for such 
deposits is usually stable. Investment products are typically risk-sensitive, for large/informed 
users, have payoffs that vary with the intermediary’s performance, involve monitoring, and 
hence demand may be more volatile. The third is the choice of maturity structure – duration 
matching affects the degree of liquidity risk, but may also reduce flexibility. 
 
A further backup is holding adequate capital to ensure that creditworthiness is maintained in 
the face of adverse shocks. However, experience has shown that adequate capital according to 
current rules is not always sufficient to ensure liquidity problems are avoided, as solvent 
                                                 
4 For a survey of the theory, see De Bandt and Hartmann (2001). 
5 For some discussion of contingent credit facilities see Gatev et al (2006). 
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banks can suffer runs due to illiquidity. Regulation of bank liquidity is less developed than for 
capital, 6 and not subject to international agreement.7 Compulsory reserve requirements are 
one policy for ensuring that banks hold liquidity, although their main purpose is for collateral 
in central bank monetary operations, overall monetary control and payments system 
functioning. Reserves are not readily available to meet a liquidity spike, especially if there is a 
mandatory minimum ratio. There is also typically qualitative oversight of liquidity policy in 
the context of prudential supervision (Pillar 2 of Basel II). 
 
Goodhart (2007) argues that generous provision of liquidity by central banks, in normal times 
and times of crisis, has made banks careless in liquidity risk management, with low liquid 
assets and reckless liability management. The banks are seen as taking a liquidity “put” with 
the downside risk of liquidity crises covered by the central bank. It is to the LOLR, that is, 
liquidity policy in times of emergency, that we now turn. 
 
3 The lender of last resort (LOLR) 
 
We now go on to outline the currently accepted views and attitudes to the LOLR, citing 
examples from history that are relevant to each point. These are the “accepted wisdom” in 
central banks, international organisations and in much of academia, which, we argue, is called 
into question by the sub-prime crisis. See for example Stevens (2008), He (2000) and Freixas 
et al (2000) for respective recent views. 
 
3.1 The nature and history of LOLR 
 
The LOLR is generally described as an institution, such as the central bank, which has the 
ability to produce, at its discretion, currency or “high-powered money” to support institutions 
facing liquidity difficulties and to create enough base money to offset public desire to switch 
into money during a crisis, thereby delaying legal insolvency of an institution and preventing 
fire sales and calling of loans.  
 
The LOLR operation is by discretionary provision of liquidity (against collateral) to an 
institution or market to offset an adverse shock that creates an abnormal increase in demand 
for liquidity. The aim of the LOLR is to prevent illiquidity at an individual bank from leading 
to insolvency (owing to the fire sale problem, as defined above). Thereby it may avoid runs 
that spill over from bank to bank (contagion, as defined above), which may in turn lead to an 
impact on real wealth and GDP that would not occur in the absence of the panic. LOLR needs 
to act rapidly before illiquidity becomes insolvency and before such a panic begins to take 
hold. 
 
We first briefly note historical developments before World War II. Although Thornton wrote 
first about the concept in 1802, the genesis of LOLR in practice is often thought to be the 
aftermath of the Overend Gurney crisis of 1866, when the Bank of England failed to prevent a 
crisis, which was subsequently reflected upon by Bagehot (1873). Put simply, he argued that 
the central bank should lend freely at a high rate against good collateral8. Furthermore, the 
central bank has to act in the public interest and not solely its private interests, as the Bank 
                                                 
6 Rochet and Vives (2004) show that a combination of liquidity requirements, capital requirements and the 
lender of last resort can prevent coordination failure in interbank markets. 
7 See Basel Committee (2008) for a recent discussion of liquidity regulation. 
8 Some would argue that a “high” rate relative to before the crisis need not be a penalty rate but most 
commentators translate it as such, e.g. Freixas et al (2000). Furthermore, in 1866 the Bank of England was 
apparently willing to compromise on collateral quality in a crisis (although normally “good” means usually 
acceptable to the central bank)  However, the point is moot since the aim of this paper is to compare LOLR in 
the sub-prime crisis with current beliefs and attitudes to the lender of last resort, and not what Bagehot wrote. 
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may have done in 1866. The classic operation of LOLR was reflected, for example, in the 
rescue of Barings Bank by the Bank of England in 1890, as well as in panics during 1878 and 
1914 (Bordo 1990). As noted by Goodhart (1988), these events took place during the period 
of the Gold Standard when the central bank was the institution maintaining convertibility of 
the currency with gold, which made it a natural LOLR, albeit generally also involving other 
banks in rescues given the limitation of its own capital base.9 Combined with uncertainty 
regarding rescues, the “club” of banks in a national market would protect against moral 
hazard by policing behaviour of counterparties, even in the absence of modern banking 
regulation.  
 
Even after the demise of the Gold Standard, the key role of the LOLR has often been 
considered to offset the risk of a monetary contraction, as in 1932 in the US. However, as 
argued by Kaufman (1991), its more recent operation against a background of deposit 
insurance does not have this function, as a general flight from the banking system to currency 
is unlikely. Rather, crises tend to lead to a reshuffling of deposits between banks, and the 
LOLR seeks to limit losses of wealth and GDP that would otherwise take place when such 
reshuffling occurs. 
 
Focusing now on more recent episodes and current views of LOLR in a modern financial 
system, LOLR intervention can be by direct lending (discount window) or by open market 
operations, as well as by off-balance-sheet guarantees. Some argue that in an advanced 
financial system, LOLR should only be via open market operations, since the market will 
direct liquidity to where it is needed, and the risk of mispricing is avoided (Goodfriend and 
King 1988; Kaufman 1991). Such a policy was clearly successful in the cases of operations 
associated with the spikes in liquidity demand in the Y2K and September 11 episodes, as well 
as after the stock market crash of October 1987.  
 
However, Goodhart (1999) argues that LOLR may require direct lending, not open market 
operations, as market lending may fail to reach banks in distress whose failure threatens the 
financial system. This motivated, for example, the rescue of Continental Illinois in 1984, 
which was also thought to give rise to a risk of contagion due to its widespread interbank 
lending links (179 banks were thought to be vulnerable). In 1974 the Bundesbank let the 
Herstatt Bank fail, while giving liquidity assistance to the market in line with Goodfriend and 
King, but the consequence was a global breakdown of payments systems that almost 
precipitated an international financial crisis (Davis 1995). The need for direct lending, and the 
choice it implies means central banks are involved in bank closure policy (a prudential policy) 
and not just technical liquidity provision (a monetary policy), see Freixas and Parigi (2008). 
 
Instruments of such direct support can be the discounting of eligible paper (such as 
government securities), advanced with or without collateral, and repos of the institution’s 
assets that the central bank is willing to accept. The value of collateral should exceed that of 
the LOLR support. There should be provisions for repayment and the provision of funds by 
the LOLR must be for the short term only, allowing examination of the financial institution 
for long-term viability. If there is default on LOLR loans, closure is needed, or if the bank is 
too-big-to-fail, it should be nationalised with owners and senior managers dismissed. 
 
Generally, LOLR to date has been to banks and not for non-banks such as securities houses. 
Reasons are that banks are more systemically important and also so as not to weaken market 
discipline on less heavily regulated institutions. This was one reason for the refusal of the US 
to support Drexel Burnham Lambert in 1989 (although the Bank of Japan did save Yamaichi 
                                                 
9 As noted by Bordo (1990), the Barings rescue included commercial banks and the Banque de France as well as 
the Bank of England. 
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in the 1990s, see Nakaso 2001). Equally, prudent investment banks, although dependent on 
wholesale funding, would typically hold short-term assets, protecting them against liquidity 
risk.  
 
3.2 Costs of LOLR 
 
There are costs to having a LOLR (He 2000). The LOLR is only supposed to aid illiquid and 
not insolvent institutions (Humphrey and Keleher 1984). However, in a crisis it is hard to 
distinguish illiquid and insolvent banks, and a bank that may initially be illiquid can become 
insolvent. Goodhart and Schoenmaker (1995) note that banks generally face illiquidity when 
solvency is in question. Hence, liquidity assistance may lead to support for insolvent 
institutions, with direct costs for the central bank and fiscal authorities. Kaufman (1991) notes 
that the US Federal Reserve System (Fed), for example, supported Franklin National in 1974 
and Bank of New England in 1990, which both subsequently failed. Furthermore, it is 
generally considered that LOLR is not an appropriate policy alone in cases of simultaneous 
macroeconomic shocks to solvency – such as in the contraction of GDP in Finland in 1990 – 
which may require the fiscal authorities to recapitalise banks. 
 
As noted, beyond direct costs, the safety net reduces the incentive for banks to hold liquidity, 
as risk is passed to the central bank (Goodhart 2007). It may also facilitate uninsured 
depositors exiting a bank (Kaufman 1991). Most crucially, LOLR increases moral hazard and 
consequent risk taking, as well as weakening market discipline.10,11 Arguably this is 
particularly the case for direct lending as opposed to open market operations. It is widely 
argued that the long-term decline in bank capital adequacy up to the 1988 Basel Agreement, 
as well as lower liquidity buffers, results from moral hazard generated by the safety net.  
 
Further costs are that, if offered to insolvent banks, LOLR support increases the scope for 
forbearance. This is because it removes the pressure on regulators to close failing banks 
promptly (especially if the regulator is a separate institution from the central bank). If allowed 
to continue operating, banks with negative net worth can cause major costs, as in the Savings 
and Loan crisis in the US in the 1980s. LOLR for the insolvent institution also raises the 
difficulty of institutions being too-big-to-fail – some banks can become “sure” of rescue 
owing to their systemic importance, and this is also reflected in ratings (again the rescue of 
Continental Illinois was arguably the genesis of this). 
 
A further cost is conflict with other policies. There may be conflicts with the monetary policy 
regime, unless liquidity is fully sterilised (the LOLR action at the time of the stock market 
crash in 1987 was seen as generating inflation). It may also conflict with fiscal rules if there is 
a guarantee by the fiscal authority. 
 
3.3 Minimising costs of LOLR 
 
Current views of LOLR maintain that minimising such costs requires that there be only 
support for institutions whose failure entails systemic risk. The central bank must ensure that 
banks have made efforts to gain liquidity support and all market sources of funds have been 
exhausted. Equally, it is often argued that the authorities should demand high quality 
collateral and a penalty interest rate. The former protects the central bank from credit risk and 
encourages the banks to lend at lower risk (Goodhart 2007). The latter, along with harsh 
conditionality (for example, liquidity restoration, restrictions on new business or on dividend 
                                                 
10 As a consequence, Kane (1992) argues that LOLR is inappropriate and should be abolished given the cost of 
moral hazard. 
11 This is illustrated by the existence of “support ratings” for banks alongside their standalone ratings. 
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payments), ensures that the borrower only requests LOLR support as a “last resort”. Bordo 
(1990) notes however that in 1974 the Fed offered Franklin National loans at below market 
rates. 
 
To further reduce moral hazard, current views state that the central bank should seek a private 
solution before using the LOLR (from the creditors, other major banks, etc.). This has been 
the tradition in Continental Europe and indeed it is enshrined in French Law. In Germany, the 
private Likobank is intended to substitute for the possibility of the central bank needing to 
undertake LOLR. On the other hand, experience has shown that banks are increasingly less 
willing to play a role in such rescues, owing to deregulation and international competition 
(Goodhart and Schoenmaker 1995). The Bank of England experience with the rescue of 
Johnson Matthey in 1984 showed this. The wholly-private rescue of LTCM in 1998, however, 
was a recent example of creditors being willing to mount a rescue – of a hedge fund – without 
guarantee, showing that private rescues are still viable in extreme cases, with suitable moral 
suasion by central banks. 
 
The LOLR must also ensure that there is adequate information on financial institutions and 
strict financial regulation; although Goodhart and Schoenmaker (1995) do not conclude that 
there is a benefit to overall financial stability from the central bank being the supervisor. 
 
To avoid monetary conflict, the central bank must sterilise liquidity – otherwise there is a risk 
of inflation, capital outflows and a collapsing currency (as occurred in Indonesia in 1997; He 
2000). This requires instruments be available such as reverse repos, foreign exchange swaps 
and deposit facilities. There is also a need for backup from the fiscal authorities if the rescued 
bank is insolvent, otherwise the central bank may itself face solvency difficulties, as in 
Finland in 1990 when the central bank saved an insolvent savings bank and wiped out its own 
capital. 
 
The central bank should reduce moral hazard by making access to LOLR facilities uncertain – 
the market is not to take for granted the action to be followed by the authorities, with 
decisions to be made on a case-by-case basis. The Bank of England has, for example, allowed 
banks such as Barings in 1995 to fail, since it was judged to be non-systemic. Ambiguity may 
be heightened by secrecy as to whether LOLR is taking place, as with the small UK banks 
that were rescued in the early 1990s, so as to avoid wider loss of confidence and ultimately 
underwriting the whole banking system (George 1994). Confidentiality can also help to 
prevent knowledge of LOLR support from giving rise to panic, a rise in borrowing costs or a 
loss of reputation to the bank in receipt of LOLR. 
 
He (2000) suggests that central banks could nevertheless spell out necessary but not sufficient 
conditions for LOLR (for example, a precondition of solvency and exhausting available 
sources of funds) – thus reducing incentives for unnecessary crises and giving incentives for 
stabilising private sector actions. This might also reduce risks of forbearance and political 
interference. But ex ante transparency may heighten the risk of runs, and give rise to moral 
hazard (Economist 2008b). There remains a strong case for ex post transparency (that is, 
saying what has been done after the crisis has subsided, to ensure accountability in the use of 
public funds). 
 
Generally to date, LOLR has been in domestic currency (on the argument that banks should 
be responsible for foreign exchange risk management). In this context, there is the unresolved 
problem for cross-border banks (notably in the European Union) of whether the home or host 
LOLR should play the largest role in a crisis. 
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3.4 LOLR in systemic crises 
 
So far we have discussed LOLR for a non-systemic problem. In times of systemic crisis it 
may act differently (Hoelscher and Quintyn 2003). This is a situation of panic, flight-to-
quality and widespread contagion. The aim is to reassure the public that financial disorder will 
be limited and to stop panic runs, by public announcements and visibility. The central bank 
may need to provide uniform support for all banks short of liquidity, even if they are 
suspected to be insolvent, in order to protect the payments system and the macroeconomy. 
Constructive ambiguity is no longer appropriate (Nakaso 2001). Collateral and solvency 
requirements may be relaxed, at least if there is a government guarantee. No penalty rates 
would be imposed as they would worsen the panic. Also the central bank would need to 
suspend judgement of which institutions are systemically important. 
 
Emergency liquidity assistance in such cases is likely to be part of the overall crisis 
management strategy involving the central bank, supervisors and the fiscal authorities. It may 
require a general macroeconomic policy easing (for example, interest rate cuts) as a crisis by 
itself constitutes a tightening of financial conditions. However, care is needed to avoid 
inflation or an exchange rate collapse. There is an option of imposing capital controls (as in 
Malaysia in 1997). Costs of such emergency assistance policies can be sizeable. Hoelscher 
and Quintyn (2003) record that liquidity support during the Asian crisis was 16 per cent of 
GDP in Indonesia in the form of overdrafts from the bank, and 13 per cent of GDP in 
Malaysia from central bank deposits (which were, however, repaid). 
 
In a systemic crisis, there may also be a blanket deposit guarantee by the government, as in 
Japan and Sweden in the 1990s, and the fiscal authorities will have to bear the costs of bank 
recapitalisation. The overall fiscal costs of crisis will thus often far exceed the LOLR 
assistance – in Indonesia the overall cost was around 50 per cent of GDP. This potential fiscal 
burden, in turn, helps motivate the separation of regulation from central banks (Goodhart and 
Schoenmaker 1995). It also underlines the point that liquidity assistance must not be a long-
term policy – it should be used to stop panics and buy time for evaluation of the financial 
system. The government may need to recapitalise or close insolvent banks in a long-term 
restructuring (as took place in Sweden and Finland in the early 1990s). The LOLR is still 
needed in a systemic crisis if the credibility of the deposit insurance scheme is lacking (or 
depositors fear delay in repayments) – in which case the fiscal authorities may also need to 
guarantee the central bank. 
 
Having outlined liquidity risk, bank liquidity policy and evolving views of the LOLR, we now 
go on to assess whether the current sub-prime crisis requires our understanding of these 
concepts to be revised. 
 
4 Recent developments in liquidity risk 
 
4.1 The sub-prime crisis and liquidity 
 
We suggest that the understanding of the liquidity problems in the current crisis requires 
theory to go beyond the Diamond-Dybvig (1983) concept of bank funding liquidity risk, to 
encompass market liquidity risk and its interaction with funding liquidity against a 
background of heightened credit risk (see also IMF 2008). It also requires consideration of the 
impact of banks’ policies of marking to market, risk management and balance sheet 
management (Adrian and Shin 2008). Market liquidity risk can be defined as the ease with 
which one can liquidate a position in an asset without appreciably altering its price. 
Institutions and markets were shown to be much closer integrated than in the past. Systemic 
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market liquidity problems were only apparent before the sub-prime crisis during the Russia-
LTCM crisis (Davis 1999, IMF 1998) – although in the case of Russia/LTCM the banks were 
relatively unscathed. We first describe the build up to the sub-prime crisis, as well as the crisis 
itself, before considering relevant liquidity risk paradigms.12 
 
Key developments in the period 2000 to 2007 include the accelerating shift by banks from 
holding loans on balance sheet to relying on securitisation (which in turn reduced the 
incentive to monitor loans). Banks held increasingly low levels of on-balance-sheet liquid 
assets and they undertook aggressive wholesale liability management to maintain funding 
levels. Banks also attempted to shift risk to off-balance-sheet conduits and structured 
investment vehicles (SIVs) in order to save capital under Basel 1 rules.13 These shifts 
occurred in a context of low global interest rates, arising in turn from high levels of global 
liquidity, which prompted a hunt for yield (for example, via higher credit risk in structured 
products and sub-prime loans). More generally, scope for securitisation (and the impression of 
liquidity it gave), high credit ratings on asset backed securities (ABS) and the seeming 
precision of risk models based on inadequate data, may have lulled banks into taking on more 
credit risk than they otherwise would. 
 
By 2007 there was a growing realisation of potential losses on sub-prime mortgages (that is, 
credit risk) as US house prices fell and defaults increased. These loans had been widely 
packaged into ABS. Investors, concerned not only about losses on the underlying assets but 
also lack of transparency as to how individual ABS would be affected, began to sell them. 
Sales led in turn not just to price falls but also market liquidity failure for the OTC markets 
for the ABS. As prices fell, trading became difficult or impossible, even among the lowest 
risk tranches of the relevant securities. This signalled the beginning of what in retrospect can 
be seen as the non-systemic period of the crisis, dating from August 2007 to September 2008. 
 
As noted by the ECB (2008), price falls affected not only the standardised instruments such as 
index-based collateralised debt obligations (CDOs) but also the “bespoke” structures that are 
not normally traded but which are nonetheless marked to market. This link followed from the 
fact that implicit prices for the latter are derived from the former. Furthermore, Scheicher 
(2008) shows econometrically that, over and above concerns regarding credit risk, there were 
significant concerns about market liquidity and the lower appetite for risk in accounting for 
the fall in prices (the rise in spreads). Such liquidity and risk aversion effects are omitted from 
standard CDO pricing models.14 
 
This liquidity failure was aggravated by rising margin requirements, which limited the 
freedom of speculative investors such as hedge funds, and led them to sell holdings of ABS. It 
was also worsened by the lack of risk capital allocated to market making in such products, due 
to the rise in volatility and lower revenues to investment banks, which limited their ability to 
take risks.  
 
The rush to sell securitised assets may also have been worsened by effects of price falls in the 
context of mark-to-market accounting on the capital of leveraged institutions. Long term 
investors may have been constrained from taking contrarian positions that could have 
renewed market liquidity due to excessive leverage (for example, of hedge funds) and 
consequent credit restrictions in the context of mark-to-market accounting (Economist 2008a). 
                                                 
12 For a more detailed summary see Brunnermeier (2008). 
13 The capital charge on credit lines to such subsidiaries were less than those of holding the assets on balance 
sheet. 
14 The corollary is that the potential scale of losses is exaggerated by using a mark-to-market approach to value 
such illiquid securities (Bank of England 2008a). 
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Monoline insurers, that provide some credit guarantees to ABS and credit default swaps 
(CDS) themselves, also came under financial pressure (Bank of England 2008a). Another 
factor was reliance of some institutions on quantitative techniques of trading and risk 
management that assumed continuous liquidity (IMF 2008). 
 
Banks were also rapidly affected by the loss of liquidity in the market for securitised loans. 
They had to mark-to-market ABS held on-balance-sheet in the trading book, so price falls 
affected their solvency. This was unlike banking crises in the past where loans have typically 
been held at historic cost in the banking book with no specific price. The fact that a great 
many ABS were held in conduits and SIVs spread the contagion, since these institutions 
require financing in the market for asset-backed commercial paper. Doubts by money market 
funds regarding the ABS held by the conduits and SIVs led to a loss of liquidity in the ABCP 
market also, which meant that sponsoring banks had to take the assets back on their balance 
sheets. The extensive holding of US ABS by European banks and related conduits and SIVs 
spread the impact internationally. 
 
Meanwhile, traders’ attempts to hedge, meet margin calls or realise gains in safer or more 
liquid markets adversely affected liquidity in other markets in a contagious manner. Market 
makers in a range of markets were often unwilling to trade at posted prices (IMF 2008) due to 
uncertainty, volatility and concern about the risks of counterparty default. 
 
The crisis has revealed new patterns in funding-liquidity risk which stem from market-
liquidity risks. Banks were unable to securitise the mortgages and other loans they were 
issuing, owing to the collapse of the ABS market. They also experienced calls on backup lines 
of credit for conduits and SIVs that were unable to issue ABCP. Accordingly, banks hoarded 
liquidity in order to provide sufficient funding for their ongoing business. This hoarding was 
aggravated by fear of counterparty risk in the interbank market, due to other banks’ 
undisclosed losses on ABS from stresses affecting credit quality and the availability of 
liquidity. Mark-to-market becomes a highly uncertain process when liquidity collapses (ECB 
2008), giving rise to concern that the assets of counterparties are mismeasured. One 
consequence of these problems of funding-liquidity was the failure of the solvent UK 
mortgage bank Northern Rock, despite provision of LOLR. Northern Rock had pursued an 
aggressive reliance on both wholesale funding and the securitisation of assets, which was no 
longer feasible (UK Parliament 2008), and its failure was considered likely to cause 
contagion. In contrast, the US bank Countrywide was able to rely on liability insurance 
contracts that limited the scope for a run, a feature not present in earlier crises.15 
 
These combined features led on to the emergence of historically large premia – and quantity-
rationing of funds – in the domestic interbank markets in the US, UK and Euro Area, at all but 
overnight maturities, alongside the securities markets16. Funding at three months in particular 
became very difficult to obtain. These patterns in turn meant that funding-liquidity risk was 
closely related to market-liquidity risk. Banks were vulnerable to this linkage due to their low 
holdings of liquid assets, growth in reliance on short-term wholesale funding,17 dependence 
on securitisation and the rise in overall maturity mismatch on their balance sheets related to 
SIVs and conduits. Banks in the wake of this sought to reduce balance sheet lending, and 
hoard liquidity, at the same time that borrowers were rendered cautious by house price falls, 
leading also to unprecedented falls in mortgage lending. Banks were also concerned about 
                                                 
15 Goodhart (2007), however, notes that such liability insurance is not a resolution for a systemic crisis, as it 
merely relocates liquidity risk. 
16 The remaining paragraphs of this section are based on Barrell and Davis (2008). 
17 Bradley and Shibut (2006) show US banks’ ratios of deposits to liabilities has fallen from 93 per cent in 1965 to 60 per 
cent since 2000. 
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counterparty risk given the opacity of bank balance sheets in general and the difficulty of 
valuing CDOs in particular. Central banks offered massive volumes of liquidity to supply 
banks and sought to restart the interbank funding markets. Beyond Northern Rock, failures in 
2007 included two small German banks. The casualties of this ongoing pattern in the period 
up to Summer 2008 were much more important. They included Bear Stearns (taken over with 
government guarantees), IndyMac (failed) and Fanny Mae and Freddy Mac (effectively 
nationalised). 
 
The ongoing process unleashed by the crisis can be referred to as deleveraging (IMF, 2008b), 
as banks and other institutions sought to reduce exposure to high risk sectors, selling assets or 
reducing asset growth, as well as reducing dependence on unstable wholesale funding and 
rebuilding capital adequacy. Arguably, it is also involving a reduction in the excess capacity 
that has built up in the financial system over many years (Davis and Salo, 1998). The process 
was aggravated by the ongoing fall in asset prices and rise in private sector defaults on loans, 
as noted above, as well as by closure of securitisation markets, notably in Europe.  
 
By September 2008 it seemed that the crisis was ongoing, but not worsening. However, 
following the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers (unsupported by the authorities) in mid-
September, there was a sharp worsening of market conditions and the process of deleveraging 
became disorderly as counterparty risk perceptions ballooned. This began what can now be 
seen as the systemic period of the crisis. 
 
The equity market, which had been surprisingly little affected by the crisis up to that point, 
began to fall sharply. This particularly reflected low confidence in banks that were dependent 
on wholesale funding. They suffered shrinking capital due to mark-to-market losses, while 
markets for wholesale funds, that had previously been costly and restrictive, proved to be 
totally closed to such institutions after Lehman’s failure. Cross-border lending was even more 
sharply curtailed than domestic, showing again the historic instability of the international 
interbank market (Bernard and Bisignano, 2000).  
 
Money market funds in particular underwent losses on Lehmans’ short-term debt when that 
firm collapsed, and this led to one of them, Reserve Primary, ‘breaking the dollar’ (i.e. with a 
unit value falling below a dollar) and needing to be liquidated. The sector then suffered loss of 
public confidence and underwent massive redemptions ($184 billion in two weeks). Similar 
patterns of sizeable redemption emerged for hedge funds and mutual funds, leading to forced 
asset sales in illiquid markets, which intensified the downward spiral in asset prices and 
widening of credit spreads. Instead of offering liquid funds to banks, money market funds 
began rather to compete with them for financing. A large number of creditors, including 
significant hedge funds, had their assets frozen in the Lehman bankruptcy, and were forced to 
find alternative funds, adding to selling pressure in equity, bond and money markets. A major 
flight to quality occurred, with investors seeking the safe haven of government debt. 
 
The authorities acted in the wake of the worsening of market conditions. The US authorities 
devised and passed the Paulson plan, which was designed to restore liquidity to the markets 
by using $700 billion to buy up mortgage backed securities. However, this plan as initially 
proposed did not initially address the solvency of the banks directly, and left many exposed. 
Money market funds were supported in due course by the Treasury and Federal Reserve. The 
Fed also began to purchase commercial paper directly from non-financial companies to avoid 
a liquidity crunch for them, after the investor base dried up. The American Insurance Group 
(AIG) had made a major foray into insuring complex products, and had lost most of its capital 
base when default rates rose to ten times those on which polices were based. It, along with 
Bradford and Bingley in the UK, had to be nationalised in succession. Merrill Lynch and 
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Wachovia were taken over. Washington Mutual was closed by regulators and sold to JP 
Morgan Chase. The remaining US investment banks had to become bank holding companies.  
 
Banks dependent on cross-border financing were hardest hit. For example, the two major 
Belgian banks have had to be nationalised and all three Icelandic banks failed in October. 
Significant public sector stakes totalling £37 billion were taken in three major lenders in the 
UK, HBOS, RBS and Lloyds, in order to ensure their solvency, while guarantees were offered 
for their liabilities and the Bank of England expanded its swap facility for illiquid assets. The 
effective nationalization of a large part of the UK banking sector ensured that this system 
would remain solvent, and a number of European countries announced that they would also 
strengthen the equity base of banks by taking a public share. It also appeared that the Paulson 
plan could be redirected to the same purpose, and in mid-October $250 billion was made 
available to US banks to increase their capital adequacy ratios with public stakes in their 
equities being taken in return. 
 
Public intervention had been made urgent by the fact that the equity market seemed to foresee 
a liquidity crisis for many banks when medium-term funding became due in coming years. 
The UK bank HBOS seemed close to failure until it was announced that a takeover by Lloyds 
would occur. In the week of 6–10 October, stock markets around the world fell by 25 per 
cent, despite approval of a rescue package for US banks and the announcement of a yet more 
comprehensive plan to support UK banks’ capital and liquidity. Emerging markets, that had 
hitherto been relatively unscathed, began to be badly affected (IMF, 2008b) as external 
finance became much harder to obtain. 
 
The period from October 2008 to end-year saw a calming of the systemic risks that had 
become apparent, but a spreading of the crisis to the real economy in a range of countries, 
with growing concerns over credit rationing, including by banks that had received significant 
public assistance, and major bankruptcies in the non-financial sector. Unemployment has 
begun to rise sharply, notably in the UK and US, while house prices continue to fall and loan 
defaults were increasing. There is at the time of writing (January 2009) growing concern over 
the risk of price deflation, that could lead to rising real interest rates on debt and the risk of a 
debt-deflation. Furthermore, although extreme turbulence had subsided, the authorities 
remained concerned about an adverse feedback loop, in which economic weakness 
exacerbates financial stress, which in turn leads to further economic damage (Bernanke 2008). 
 
4.2 Relevant liquidity risk paradigms 
 
In evaluating the sub-prime crisis, it clearly has elements of the standard liquidity crisis 
paradigm (Tirole 2008), such as an aggregate liquidity shock (fall in house prices), 
deterioration of underlying loan quality, fire sales (of ABS) and runs (on Northern Rock, Bear 
Stearns and Lehman Brothers). Moreover, the run up to the crisis showed the familiar signs of 
the procyclicality of financial markets (Borio et al 2001). However, there were also a number 
of less familiar elements. 
 
We suggest that one helpful paradigm for the crisis is to reinterpret the concept of liquidity 
insurance, central to the Diamond and Dybvig (1983) model in the context of securities 
markets. Securities markets offer liquidity insurance, but in a different way to banks, by 
increasing the ease with which assets may be transformed into cash prior to maturity (Davis 
1994; and Bernardo and Welch 2004). Yields are generally lower in highly liquid securities 
markets, as investors are more willing to hold a claim if they are confident of its liquidity. 
Unlike at-call deposits at banks, there is no guarantee of a fixed rate at which securities can be 
liquidated immediately, but short-term high-quality debt securities provide a considerable 
 14
degree of security. Meanwhile, so long as markets remain liquid, the investor benefits from a 
shorter effective maturity than offered by the issuer, thus there is again maturity 
transformation. 
 
Like banking, however, market liquidity depends on all other holders not seeking to realise 
their assets at the same time. If doubt arises over the future liquidity of the securities market it 
is rational to sell first, before the disequilibrium between buyers and sellers becomes too great 
and market failure occurs. That is, prices are driven down sharply, and selling in quantity 
becomes extremely difficult. Such collapses may result from a fear of deteriorating funding 
conditions, which leads a number of investors to sell assets simultaneously before they are 
forced to do so under fire-sale conditions. 
 
A loss of liquidity in debt markets may have externalities similar to bank failures. This may 
be particularly true if: there are leveraged investors who are forced to sell despite such 
illiquidity; there is contagion between markets; illiquidity makes investors unwilling to accept 
new issues; and there are debtors including SIVs who do not have an alternative source of 
rollover finance.18 Note that all of these channels are relevant to the description of the sub-
prime crisis above, particularly with respect to the liquidity failure of the ABS and ABCP 
markets. Following “runs” on these markets, the interbank market was adversely affected, as 
banks that could not securitise – and had to finance backup lines – hoarded liquidity. Such 
patterns were unprecedented, given the enhanced role of banks as asset sellers and liquidity 
providers this decade. 
 
The nature of liquidity failure in securities markets is further clarified by analysis of the role 
of market makers, whose importance was again outlined in the description above. The 
response of market makers to "one way selling", where the new equilibrium price is uncertain, 
is often simply to refuse to quote firm prices, for fear of accumulating stocks of depreciating 
securities. This contributes to a collapse of liquidity. Uncertainty is crucial; if there is a clear 
new market-clearing price at which buyers will re-emerge, the market makers will adjust their 
prices accordingly. Such uncertainty was seen as a key feature of the recent crisis, relating 
notably to structured products, which had no price history to help predict behaviour under 
stress (Caruana and Kodres 2008), and which also led to banks being unable to price their 
own assets. 
 
The collapse of dealer markets, even in the absence of generalised uncertainty and one way 
selling, may result from perceptions of asymmetric information (Glosten and Milgrom 1985; 
and Kyle 1985). A rise in the share of insiders leads market makers to widen spreads to avoid 
losses. This discourages liquidity traders, who withdraw, increasing adverse selection. Some 
dealers may cease to operate. Once the insiders (with superior information) become too 
numerous, bid and ask prices may be too disparate to allow any trade. Here we note that banks 
feared that others were not disclosing their true losses on ABS, directly and via SIVs, so they 
refused to lend on the interbank market. Equally, ABCP investors doubted the value of assets 
in SIVs and so refused to finance them.  
 
In the case of either one way selling or acute asymmetric information, the asset market, in 
effect, ceases to function. The associated decline in liquidity is likely to increase sharply the 
                                                 
18 The parallels between banks and securities markets are not exact, since investors who are not constrained to 
sell and do not suffer defaults do not make a loss by “sitting tight” and can still make a profit on their portfolio of 
securities. In other words, markets, unlike banks, may become illiquid but cannot become insolvent. Equally, the 
difficulties for issuers arise only in the case that an existing issue of securities needs rolling over – or there is a 
pressing need for a further issue – when the liquidity problem arises. 
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cost of raising primary debt in such a market (that is, there will effectively be heightened price 
rationing of credit), or it may even be impossible to gain investor interest at any price 
(quantity rationing). The closure of markets for securitisation fits this description. 
 
The IMF (2008) argue that market liquidity collapses are particularly likely when market 
makers lack absorptive capacity, for example, due to costs of funding inventory and internal 
capital limits, which will in turn relate to whether returns to market making are low. Gromb 
and Vanayos (2008) argue that there is a feedback loop, as price falls hit the capital of dealers, 
making them less willing to make markets. Indeed they may sell existing inventories, 
aggravating the problem. Market liquidity collapses may also occur more commonly when 
there is no clear order of trading, as in OTC markets, and when market makers are risk averse 
(Bernardo and Welch 2004). There can also be spillovers between funding instruments when 
firms are active in several markets, as market makers and/or arbitrageurs, as liquidity needs in 
one market lead to early liquidation of assets in other markets. 
 
Adrian and Shin (2008) also suggest that contagion during the current crisis differed, in quite 
specific ways, from that in traditional liquidity crisis models. The traditional view, as set out 
in Section 1 is that credit risk leads to contagion, either via direct exposures or uncertainty 
over opaque balance sheets. In the current world, Adrian and Shin argue that contagion occurs 
via changes in market prices, according to the way that risks as measured and the mark-to-
market practices of financial institutions. Financial institutions are seen to manage balance 
sheets actively in response to price changes and measured risk. Moreover, this appears to have 
led to a positive relation between changes in leverage of commercial banks and balance sheet 
size, as they have taken on behaviour patterns hitherto more typical of investment banks.  
 
In an upturn, when balance sheets are strong, banks see leverage as too low and seek to 
expand balance sheets by increasing lending and incurring short-term liabilities. This is seen 
as boosting aggregate liquidity across the economy as a whole, facilitating lending to sub-
prime borrowers in the run up to 2007.  As things turn down, perhaps in response to an 
adverse shock to market prices (as occurred due to heightened perceptions of credit risk and 
the collapse of market liquidity in 2007), financial institutions that mark to market find their 
leverage too high and seek to contract their balance sheets. Cifuentes et al (2004) note that 
fire sales of assets by distressed institutions may aggravate such a pattern by further 
depressing market prices. Note the contrast with traditional crises, in which a deterioration of 
credit quality would have no immediate direct effect on the balance sheet assuming that 
valuations are based on book values. Mark-to-market creates a new and much closer link from 
illiquidity to insolvency, since a loss of liquidity causes price falls that impact solvency 
directly, leading in turn to further attempts to sell and further price falls. 
 
Adrian and Shin (2008) show that a pattern of desired reduction in leverage is precisely what 
happened successfully in the Russia/LTCM crisis. However, the current crisis was different 
because banks found themselves obliged to expand credit to cover backup commitments for 
SIVs and conduits, due to the closure of the ABCP market. Also, the closure of the ABS 
market meant that banks had to hold mortgages they were issuing on balance sheet. In such a 
situation, it is argued that they quickly cut back on discretionary lending, most notably to the 
domestic interbank market. 
 
A helpful complementary paradigm of funding liquidity that encompasses some of the events 
of the 2007 and 2008 crisis is provided by Freixas et al (2000b). According to this model, 
liquidity may dry up for a solvent bank in the interbank market if there is imperfect 
information, or if there is market tension which reduces the lending banks’ excess liquidity 
and reduces its scope to diversify. The interbank market as a whole may face liquidity 
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problems if each bank refuses to lend to others because it cannot be confident of its own 
ability to borrow, a form of liquidity crisis akin to the Diamond-Dybvig model. 
 
Brunnermeier (2008) talks of four mechanisms by which small shocks are amplified, leading 
to a loss of liquidity. These are first, borrowers’ balance sheet effects comprising a loss spiral 
(as an initial loss on a leveraged balance sheet leads to a decline in net worth, sales and price 
movements, further reducing net worth) and a margin spiral (as increased margins lead to 
deleveraging and sales, leading to lower prices, further increasing margins). Second is a 
lending channel effect (notably precautionary hoarding of liquidity). Third are runs on 
institutions and markets (including the interbank, ABCP and investment bank repo markets). 
Fourth are network effects, for example, when Goldman Sachs expressed concerns about 
exposures to Bear Stearns via swap netting arrangement, hedge funds avoided Bear Stearns as 
a prime broker thereby helping to bring about its demise. 
 
5 The lender of last resort and the sub-prime crisis – the non systemic period 
 
Besides needing a new understanding of the nature of liquidity failure in financial crises, the 
recent turmoil has raised a number of issues for the traditional LOLR role of central banks 
(described in Section 3 above), suggesting a need to amend some traditional views. These 
issues did not come into play in the same way in the otherwise-similar Russia/LTCM crisis 
(Davis 1999), where the resolution occurred largely via a private sector rescue of the hedge 
fund (albeit under pressure from the Fed) and interest rate cuts by the Fed. Following the 
same order as Section 3, we now go on to discuss issues relating to open market operations 
and individual lending; the nature of open market operations; the widening of the safety net 
from commercial banks; the issue of illiquidity and insolvency; conflicts with other 
macroeconomic policies; collateral policies; private sector rescues; difficulties with 
information; reputation of banks and LOLR confidentiality; interaction with deposit 
insurance; and international concerns. 
 
The sub-prime crisis can be seen in two parts, non systemic and systemic, as noted above. In 
the latter, policy involved the fiscal authorities in widespread guarantees and bailouts outside 
the LOLR framework as is typical of a major systemic banking crisis as cited in Hoelscher 
and Quintyn (2003). This is dealt with separately in Section 6. 
 
5.1 The sub-prime crisis and the nature of LOLR 
 
Earlier we discussed whether open market operations or individual lending was most 
appropriate for LOLR. For the most part during the current crisis, LOLR was in the form of 
open market operations, but under unprecedented conditions. Extreme tightness of the 
interbank market in all but overnight maturities had not hitherto been a feature of domestic 
markets in advanced countries, although as noted it has been common in emerging markets, 
and in the international interbank market. Accordingly, the Fed and ECB in August 2007 and 
the Bank of England also thereafter intervened heavily to overcome the liquidity crisis in the 
interbank markets – which had negated the usual method of distributing liquidity around the 
banking system, including to banks lacking access to open market operations. Note that such 
policies do appear to be close to standard open market operations, but we contend that the 
emergency operations cited were “LOLR-like” in the sense of being to satisfy short term 
increases in the demand for reserve money, as opposed to setting interest rates per se.19 
Interestingly, the impact of such action on spreads was at most temporary, suggesting 
liquidity policy was not sufficient to offset a generalised shift of the interbank market to risk 
                                                 
19 Goodhart (1999) maintains that only support for individual banks should be termed LOLR. 
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aversion (Fernandez de Lis 2008), particularly because of asymmetric information making it 
impossible to distinguish solvent and insolvent banks (Freixas and Parigi 2008). 
 
Owing to the interbank market difficulties, central banks such as the ECB also felt the need to 
lend in open market operations at longer maturities than had hitherto been the case. In the US, 
the Fed introduced the Term Auction Facility (TAF) making funds available at longer terms 
than normal (up to 84 days), and also allowed lending from the discount window for up to 90 
days. This extension of the maturity of liquidity assistance was a response to the weakness of 
the longer-term interbank market and the banks’ needs for such funding in the light of the 
collapse of ABCP issuance and the demand for backup facilities. It also meant that some 
players with adequate liquidity positions had even more scope to hoard liquidity. Fernandez 
de Lis (2008) argues that such long term provision is contrary to the traditional view of LOLR 
which did not envisage a prolonged liquidity crisis in interbank markets. 
 
One puzzle in the current crisis is why it is so protracted given the amount of support central 
banks have offered to markets and institutions. A key issue is of course the underlying 
uncertainty about the valuation of assets on banks balance sheets. But, as Caballero and 
Krishnamurthy (2008) argue, there may also be underlying uncertainty as to whether central 
banks have the liquidity and instruments to resolve the crisis. 
 
We noted in Section 3.1 that traditionally LOLR assistance has been provided only to 
commercial banks.20 The Fed was forced to implicitly extend safety net protection to include 
investment banks, incurring a balance sheet guarantee for the Bear Stearns rescue via JP 
Morgan. It also made emergency liquidity available to investment banks (primary dealers in 
government securities) more generally.21 The Bear Stearns situation showed that some 
investment banks have become sufficiently systemic to warrant such rescues, not due to the 
size of their balance sheets but because of their central role in the markets for credit default 
and interest rate swaps (Economist 2008a). Equally, however, some argue that Bear Stearns 
had departed from the traditional model of investment banking by holding long term illiquid 
assets, making it particularly vulnerable to liquidity risk.  
 
Given this precedent, and wider liquidity provision, investment banks were considered at the 
time to be accorded unprecedented protection for their risk taking activities (leveraged 
balance sheet and total dependence on wholesale funding), which was widely seen as 
requiring tighter regulation. In fact the model of the standalone investment bank itself came 
under strain, and in effect proved unviable in the wake of the Lehmans bankruptcy, with the 
remaining firms either merging with commercial banks or becoming banks themselves. It can 
be argued that the rescue of Bear may have caused complacency among the remaining banks 
about risk taking that contributed to the failure of Lehmans. 
 
5.2 The sub-prime crisis and the costs of LOLR 
 
The role of markets in the crisis made the issue of only lending to the illiquid and not the 
insolvent a more complex one. In effect, central banks were at times lending in order to 
reliquify markets (also via collateral as discussed below) and only indirectly to provide 
liquidity to institutions. A market can obviously not become insolvent but its liquidity can 
impact on institutions’ solvency, as the sub-prime crisis showed and Section 4.2 highlighted. 
 
                                                 
20 This focus was retained in the Eurozone, partly reflecting a more bank based financial system and also a more 
inclusive definition of what a bank is. 
21 This was via the new Term Securities Lending Facility (TSLF). 
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Conflicts with other policies loomed large during the current crisis. Central banks injecting 
liquidity at times faced the challenge of not changing the overall monetary policy stance in an 
undesired manner. Given the need for liquidity at longer maturities than normal, sometimes 
this would entail central banks withdrawing liquidity at shorter maturities to keep the 
monetary policy stance unchanged. We note that there remained a challenge also to traditional 
interest rate setting given the unprecedented and persistent spreads between LIBOR and 
central bank rates, that made official rates a poor indicator of the true stance of monetary 
policy (Martin 2008). 
 
An unanswered question in the current crisis is how much moral hazard has been generated by 
these “new” LOLR policies. Certainly aspects, such as the extension of the safety net to 
investment banks and the easing of collateral policies, as discussed below, could have the 
effect of worsening moral hazard. 
 
5.3 The sub-prime crisis and minimising costs of LOLR 
 
It was noted that requiring good collateral is a key basis of the traditional view of the LOLR 
(although this could be eased in a systemic crisis). Some central banks implicitly responded to 
the loss of market liquidity in 2007 and 2008 by reducing collateral standards (accepting 
residential mortgages, and even ABS). This in turn could be seen as reliquifying the ABS 
market indirectly, in effect setting prices for those assets, as market maker of last resort. The 
Fed and the Bank of England extended their lists of eligible collateral, the Fed including 
credit derivatives in eligible collateral. Eventually the Bank of England set up a system of 
long term swaps for mortgages and ABS with government bonds, (the Special Liquidity 
Scheme) initially thought likely to total over £50 billion, but only for assets already held on 
the banks’ balance sheets in December 2007. 
 
This easing of collateral requirements is an inversion of traditional LOLR rules, with central 
banks possibly accepting excessive credit risk (although the latter is controlled by haircuts, 
notably by the Bank of England) and also potentially encouraging banks to continue risky 
lending practices (if such loans can still be used as collateral), and correspondingly justifying 
the banks’ low levels of liquid assets (Goodhart 2008b). Meanwhile banks had the incentive 
to hoard top quality collateral, and central banks were thought to becoming lenders of first 
resort, facing adverse selection as banks have an incentive to offer up the worst quality assets 
as collateral. This was an issue for the ECB, which did not expand its already-extensive list of 
eligible collateral, but did find that banks were undertaking ABS securitisations solely for 
ECB collateral (Economist 2008b). 
 
Current views of the LOLR state that lending should be at penalty rates to give appropriate 
incentives. In fact central banks tended to narrow spreads over bank rates, as for example in 
the US where the primary credit rate for the Fed’s discount window was reset at only 25bp 
over the federal funds rate from 100bp hitherto. This cam be seen as a response to the 
problem of stigma for banks accessing penalty rate facilities, which risked causing runs on 
themselves by doing so, as well as because a massive intervention at a penalty rate could have 
worsened interbank market tensions. 
 
Ideally private sector solutions need to be sought in order that LOLR policies avoid 
generating moral hazard. But in general these were not forthcoming in the sub-prime crisis. 
Northern Rock had to be rescued by the Bank of England and the UK government rather than 
a private sector buyer being found. Bear Stearns was only bought by JPMorgan with a Fed 
guarantee. These cases underline, on the one hand, the wide scale and scope of the problem, 
with few banks feeling strong enough to step forward as buyers. On the other hand, they also 
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reflect the uncertainty about valuations, which may have hindered private sector buyers from 
stepping forward. In the case of Northern Rock, prospective buyers in advance of the run were 
put off by the liquidity problems of the bank, as well as the protracted process of takeover in 
the UK (UK Parliament 2008, pp51-52). 
 
Adequate information was noted to be essential for efficient operation of LOLR. Northern 
Rock presented a challenge for the UK’s nascent tripartite agreement. Some commentators 
suggested that the Financial Services Authority (FSA) did not warn the Bank of England of 
the risk to Northern Rock in a timely manner. Eichengreen (2008) attributes such problems to 
differences in bureaucratic incentives and questions whether separation of regulation and 
LOLR is appropriate. The UK is introducing an enhanced role in financial stability for the 
Bank of England to rebalance the relationship between the Bank of England and the FSA.22 
 
The loss of reputation for banks obtaining support and the confidentiality of the LOLR has 
become an important issue (Goodhart 2008b). In the UK, LOLR support was offered to the 
solvent bank Northern Rock as it had suffered a loss of wholesale funding, on which it was 
heavily dependent, and it was considered too big to fail. This support was planned to be 
announced by the Bank of England, unlike its past behaviour to keep such interventions 
secret. (It has been reported that the Treasury Solicitor gave advice that secrecy was illegal 
under EU financial regulations.) However, the announcement was pre-empted by a leak to the 
British Broadcasting Corporation on the previous day. This is in stark contrast to earlier 
episodes when support was covert and successfully so.23 There followed a retail run which 
was only stopped by a government guarantee – the bank was ultimately nationalised.24 The 
internet facilitated the retail run in a manner that would not have been feasible in the past, 
both via direct withdrawals and panic when the bank’s website crashed. 
 
Particularly in the wake of this, banks were unwilling to access central bank lending facilities, 
for fear of similar reputation risk. Rather they increased market demands for liquidity, for 
example, via backup facilities, that may have worsened the tight liquidity situation (IMF 
2008). The responses to such reputational issues, also present in the US, included the TAF 
whereby the Fed made funds available not only at longer terms but also to a wider range of 
counterparties and with a wider range of collateral. This was seen as not carrying a stigma in 
contrast to discount window borrowing (the rate for which was as noted meanwhile reduced, 
contrary to traditional views, to seek to avoid stigma). 
 
The growing public awareness of limitations of the UK’s deposit insurance scheme in 2007 
was a feature in the Northern Rock case. This featured co-insurance up to a low maximum 
sum, and no guarantee of a prompt payout. By its nature, it seeks to provide protection from 
moral hazard, incentives to monitor and a degree of consumer protection – not to protect 
against runs (Goodhart 2008a). The lesson is that LOLR may be called upon more often in 
such regimes because of runs – but a comprehensive guarantee risks generating a lot of moral 
hazard (and makes more urgent a bank insolvency regime for “prompt corrective action”). 
                                                 
22 The Banking Reform Act includes, first, provision of a statutory responsibility for financial stability for the 
Bank of England; second, changes to the governance structures of the Bank of England, to support the Bank and 
the Governor in the exercise of these new responsibilities, including the establishment of a new Financial 
Stability Committee of the Court; and third, provision of a range of tools for the Bank of England to enable it to 
carry out its responsibility in this area. This includes a leading role in the implementation of the new special 
resolution regime (SRR), should it be triggered by the FSA, including powers related to deploying and 
implementing the SRR tools. 
23 The Bank of Japan faced similar challenges in 1998 when deciding not to offer LOLR to the bank LTCB, for 
fear of a loss of reputation. However, in that case a merger was seen as probable if not certain (Nakaso 2001). 
24 Further difficulties arose thereafter for the UK authorities owing to the lack of a special insolvency scheme for 
banks in that country. 
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Some would argue that it was deposit insurance problems rather than systemic risk that 
motivated the Northern Rock rescue. The UK switched directly after the Northern Rock 
debacle to 100% coverage. 
 
We noted above that the traditional LOLR was confined to the domestic banking system. The 
crisis revealed that the traditional LOLR is unsuited to the internationalised banking system. 
This was evident in the lack of liquidity in dollars for European banks, following disruption in 
the foreign currency swaps market, as underlying money markets dried up. This meant that 
banks were unable to arrange liquidity to meet payment requirements in different currencies. 
This was eased in December 2007 by cross currency swap arrangements between the ECB, 
Swiss National Bank and the Fed, linked to the TAF mentioned above.  
 
It can be argued that the domestic focus of LOLR worsened uncertainty in the globalised 
banking community, where banks have exposures in many currencies. Cooperation between 
central banks had to be increased due to the need to avoid liquidity support operations 
affecting domestic monetary conditions that could have influenced the euro/dollar exchange 
rate. Equally, there may be a need to avoid international banks “gaming” between different 
collateral requirements at the major central banks (Economist 2008b), which may in turn 
necessitate further coordination of collateral policy (Financial Stability Forum 2008). On the 
other hand, there was not a major failure of a European cross border bank in the non systemic 
period, 25 that it was acknowledged would severely test cross-border central bank and fiscal 
authorities’ cooperation. 
 
6 The lender of last resort and the sub-prime crisis – the systemic period 
 
We noted above that when a crisis becomes systemic, the view of the LOLR changes and 
many of the safeguards against moral hazard may be abandoned. The priority is given to 
preventing wholesale collapse of the system by offering protection of all banks, for example. 
Equally, an important role for the fiscal authorities emerges, taking over the safety net from 
the LOLR to a great extent. This is precisely what was seen in September-October 2008, so in 
that sense there were not radical innovations in crisis management procedures.  
 
Crucially, the fiscal authorities stepped in widely to recapitalise banks. It was realised that 
central bank liquidity assistance was no longer sufficient, and the crisis concerned solvency 
and the unsustainability of the banks’ funding model (King, 2008). In the UK, the Treasury’s 
response entailed a voluntary  recapitalisation valued at up to £50 billion for major banks, in 
the form of preference shares or ordinary shares.  The government aimed to be a temporary 
investor, with the preference shares in particular repaid over a short period of time. This was 
aimed to cut default risk and hence stem funding pressures and markets’ tendencies to value 
banks by market and not economic intrinsic value.  
 
In October 2008, a number of countries undertook similar recapitalisation policies following 
the UK initiative (Bank of England, 2008b).  Of the $700 billion Paulson plan in the US, $250 
billion was earmarked for recapitalisation, to be based on preference shares yielding 5%, and 
9% if not redeemed in five years. Countries in the Euro area as well as Switzerland and 
Sweden have also announced recapitalisations, for example amounting to Euro 41 billion for 
France and Euro 130 billion for Germany. There were fiscal rescues of banks such as Dexia 
and Fortis in Belgium that tested cross border policies in the EU with at least initial success; 
                                                 
25 As noted, the Fed accepts credit derivatives in liquidity operations while others do not, while the ECB allows 
for newly created ABS while the Bank of England restricts access to its long-term liquidity to securities already 
on banks’ balance sheets in December 2007. 
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on the other hand, the experience of the Icelandic crisis showed that such cross border failures 
can cause major difficulties for authorities in a range of countries. 
 
Controversially, there has also been overriding of merger policy guidelines in the UK to 
permit the merger of Lloyds and HBOS, where the latter was seen as vulnerable to failure as a 
standalone entity. Similar tradeoffs of financial stability against competition in financial 
markets also arise from mergers elsewhere. 
 
Deposit insurance for retail depositors has been extended to reduce risk of runs in Autumn 
2008. In the US, the FDIC increased the insured level for individual accounts from $100,000 
to $250,000. In the UK the ceiling was raised from £35,000 to £50,000. The lack of further 
retail runs meant there was less need for LOLR as at times in the past in a systemic crisis to 
cover a deposit insurance scheme whose credibility is lacking, giving rise to retail runs.26 
 
Some fiscal authorities set out to guarantee wholesale liabilities, covering money market 
borrowing and term debt. In the US, these guarantees as estimated by Bank of England 
(2008b) to be worth $1400 billion. They include for example willingness to insure, for a fee, 
the entire amount of each non-interest bearing account, and for another fee of 75bp to insure 
all senior liabilities of the bank. The UK authorities offered guarantees of bank liabilities up 
to three years’ maturity (financed by fees27) amounting to £250 billion for banks seen as 
adequately capitalised. Germany has offered for a fee to guarantee Euro 400 billion of bank 
debt. Other countries have gone further and guaranteed all wholesale liabilities, including 
Ireland, Canada, Denmark and Australia. BIS (2008) note that government recapitalisation 
leading to a junior equity stake may entail a market perception of implicit state guarantees on 
all existing liabilities, even when this is not explicit. This may in turn distort markets for debt 
seen as a close substitute for that of banks. 
 
Third, the fiscal authorities have set out to purchase illiquid and/or impaired assets. In the US 
the balance of the Paulson plan of $450 billion was initially so earmarked, but eventually was 
diverted to support of consumer finance. Belgium, Spain, Norway, Canada, Australia and 
South Korea have set up funds for the purpose of purchasing illiquid assets. Such policies face 
the difficulty of coping with the vast quantities of such assets outstanding. 
 
In the US, as noted, there was a specific problem for money market mutual funds after the 
Lehman Brothers’ bankruptcy. The “breaking the dollar” by the firm Reserve Primary led to a 
run on the remaining money market funds, aggravating selling pressures in markets and 
shortage of liquidity. Accordingly, the US Treasury temporarily stepped in to guarantee the 
value of money fund shares at a minimum value of $1, markedly extending the safety net. 
 
Although fiscal authorities thus took over much of the safety net function, there remained a 
need for massive liquidity assistance. Central banks vastly expanded their balance sheets in 
the wake of the Lehman Brothers failure. The Fed and Bank of England’s assets doubled in a 
matter of weeks, while those of the ECB and Swiss National Bank grew by more than 30% 
(BIS 2008). This reflects their growing role as intermediaries in the money market, via direct 
lending, standing facilities, open market operations and (for the Fed) lending to foreign 
central banks. One underlying factor was narrowing of spreads for central bank borrowing 
and lending where following the earlier action of the Fed, the Bank of England and ECB also 
                                                 
26 Cross border liabilities of Icelandic banks were a matter of concern, but were generally dealt with by 
Ministries of Finance. 
27 The fee payable to HM Treasury on guaranteed liabilities is based on a per annum rate of 50 basis points plus 
100% of the institutions’ median five-year Credit Default Swap (CDS) spread during July 2007-July 2008 as 
determined by HM Treasury. 
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reduced the corridor between borrowing and lending rates from 200bp to 50bp and 100bp, 
respectively. This again reduces the incidence of “penalty rates”, which as noted above is 
generally deemed appropriate in times of systemic crisis to prevent widespread runs and 
contagion that penalty rates might cause. 
 
In this context, for the most part, central banks’ role has been to expand existing facilities, as 
set out in Section 5 above, rather than create new ones. Hence, the role of lender of last resort 
has for the most part not been further amended relative to the innovations that occurred up to 
Summer 2008. The action of the fiscal authorities to some extent protected the central banks 
from the need for radical and risky new LOLR and other policies, as has at times been 
deemed necessary in past systemic crises (for example, uniform support for all banks short of 
liquidity, even if they are suspected to be insolvent, in order to protect the payments system 
and the macroeconomy, see Hoelscher and Quintyn (2003)). Indeed, to some extent the fiscal 
guarantees offer more protection to the central banks in some countries than was hitherto 
available, although this is probably offset in terms of overall credit risks taken by the central 
banks by the expanded exposures. 
 
As an example of adaptation of existing policies, the UK expanded its Special Liquidity 
Scheme to £200 billion, and the US grew its Term Securities Lending Facility to $198 billion 
in October. The Bank of England also further expanded the list of acceptable collateral for 
their operations three times in October 2008, to include for example MBS, ABS and covered 
bonds rated at least at A-.28 At the same time the ECB lowered its minimum credit rating for 
collateral from A- to BBB-. 
 
The cross border element of the crisis has also been enhanced. The US Federal Reserve 
expanded the provision of bilateral currency swap agreements to 14 foreign central banks 
instead of 2 prior to September, including those of a number of emerging market countries 
(Brazil, Korea, Mexico, Singapore), at a much greater potential value and using a wider range 
of instruments.29 Other cross border arrangements were announced in Euros and Swiss 
Francs. International aspects of the crisis were emphasized by the common announcement of 
recapitalisations and also of interest rate reductions in early October, as well as coordinated 
announcement of availability of dollar funds under the above mentioned swap facilities. These 
thus further developed central banks’ response to a novel aspect of the crisis, its international 
dimension affecting LOLR and other policies.30 On a more negative side, the Icelandic crisis 
revealed the potential difficulties of cross border failure, with lack of co-operation among 
authorities being rife.31 
 
There have also been new LOLR policies to address some of the difficulties that have arisen 
in the earlier period. For example in the UK there was a replacement of Standing Facilities by 
so-called Operational Standing Facilities with the sole aim of dealing with money market 
imbalances and not giving support to firms in distress, with penalty rates of 25bp at all times. 
This responds to a perception of stigma in the use of Standing Facilities in the non-systemic 
period (Tucker, 2008).32 Emerging market central banks at times decumulated foreign 
exchange reserves to satisfy banks’ needs for foreign currency. 
                                                 
28 BIS (2008). 
29 See BIS (2008), p14. 
30 We noted above however that Barings crisis in 1895 involved the French as well as UK central banks. 
31 The UK authorities even impounded assets of an Icelandic bank under anti terrorism provisions, apparently in 
an attempt to seek to ensure provision for UK depositors. 
32 At the same time, the UK introduced a Discount Window allowing banks to get liquidity at times of stress in 
the form of government bonds or cash for up to 30 days against a range of collateral, and also a permanent long 
term repo open market operation against classes of collateral, where counterparts bid separately and against 
different types of collateral (Bank of England 2008c). 
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On the other hand, the US Federal Reserve has been more radical in late 2008, when facing 
systemic risks. It has further widened the boundaries of the traditional LOLR to provide funds 
direct to borrowers and investors in markets rather than via intermediaries, thus acting as 
“market maker of last resort” or even “investor of last resort”. This is arguably in line with the 
paradigm of market liquidity risk argued above, as well as the market based financial system 
in the US. Note that the intervention is explicitly to bring relief to borrowers and investors in 
an illiquid market and not, as per Goodfriend and King (1988) using a liquid market to direct 
funds to institutions in distress. It is to overcome market failure and “breathe life into 
impaired markets”.  
 
Thus, for example, the Commercial Paper Funding Facility (CPFF) provides a liquidity 
backstop to U.S. issuers of commercial paper through a special purpose vehicle (SPV) that 
purchases three-month unsecured and asset-backed commercial paper directly from eligible 
issuers. There is also the creation of the Term Asset-Backed Securities Loan Facility (TALF), 
a facility that will help market participants meet the credit needs of households and small 
businesses by supporting the issuance of asset-backed securities (ABS) collateralised by 
student loans, auto loans, credit card loans, and loans guaranteed by the Small Business 
Administration (SBA).  
 
The Fed also introduced a programme to purchase the direct obligations of housing-related 
government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs) of up to $100 billion, and up to $500 billion in 
mortgage-backed securities (MBS) backed by GSEs. This is “with the view to reduce the cost 
and increase the availability of credit for the purchase of houses, which in turn should support 
housing markets and foster improved conditions in financial markets more generally”.33 
However, BIS (2008) note that it also was necessitated by the introduction of guarantees for 
bank debt as noted above, that widened the spreads on unguaranteed agency debt. Meanwhile, 
Bernanke (2008) suggests that “substantial” direct purchases of long term Treasury bonds 
with a view to lowering yields could also be considered, a form of “quantitative easing” of 
monetary policy. 
 
Under the Money Market Investor Funding Facility, the Fed also acted indirectly to liquify 
markets by extending loans to banking organizations to finance their purchases of high-
quality asset-backed commercial paper (ABCP) from money market mutual funds. This was 
expected to facilitate participation by depository institutions and bank holding companies in 
this special lending program as intermediaries between the Federal Reserve and money 
market mutual funds. Thereby it would enhance the effects of the CPFF but also support 
directly the money market funds after the Treasury guarantee expired, limiting further 
redemptions and market impact. 
 
The Fed also acted jointly with the Treasury as LOLR by direct lending to a number of 
institutions whose failure was thought to threaten financial stability, unlike the other central 
banks who for the most part left such “solvency lending” in the systemic phase to the fiscal 
authorities. For example, the Fed provided the 2 year credit line needed for the support of the 
insurance company AIG, thus extending the safety net further beyond investment banks to 
insurance companies as well as money market funds. AIG had to be saved because of its 
involvement in the CDS market and consequent potentially-contagious links to banks. The 
Fed also participated in the recapitalisation of Citigroup, the bringing of the GSEs into 
conservatorship and assisted in the resolution of troubled banks such as Wachovia. This is 
arguably contrary to the view that central banks are advised to avoid such recapitalisations in 
                                                 
33 Federal Reserve (2008). 
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a systemic crisis, although the Fed did benefit either from good collateral or a Treasury 
guarantee.  
 
Federal Reserve Chairman Bernanke (2008) noted the absence of LOLR in the case of the 
liquidity crisis at Lehmans, and suggests that it was due to lack of a legal framework for 
resolution of systemic non banks, lack of a potential buyer (unlike Bear Stearns) and 
inadequate value of assets given the firms’ obligations (unlike for AIG). He notes that the 
authorities obtained greater flexibility in the wake of the later passing of the Emergency 
Economic Stabilisation Act (EESA), which permitted bank recapitalisation by the Treasury. 
The implication seems to be that Lehmans would not have been allowed to fail had this Act 
been in force. Bernanke appears to take the view that moral hazard and the too-big-to-fail 
problem must wait for the crisis to be over to be resolved, not least in the light of the damage 
caused by the Lehmans bankruptcy. Such remarks risks diluting any salutary effect on market 
discipline that could have arisen from the Lehman’s failure (i.e. as an illustration of 
constructive ambiguity), again revealing that moral hazard considerations are not to the 
forefront when there is systemic risk. 
 
On balance, overall crisis resolution policies in the systemic phase rightly aimed to 
recapitalise, guarantee liabilities (by fiscal authorities) and provide extensive central bank 
liquidity (by central banks), until market conditions return to normal. These are classic and 
appropriate responses to systemic financial crises, a situation of panic, flight to quality, and 
widespread contagion. The aim is to reassure the public that financial disorder will be limited 
and to stop panic runs – by public announcements and visibility (Hoelscher and Quintyn, 
2003) and action by fiscal as well as monetary authorities. All of these attempt to minimise 
damage to the non-financial sector due to credit rationing, as occurred following bank failures 
in the Great Depression (Bernanke, 1983). We have suggested that in terms of the argument 
of this paper, the (generally subsidiary) role of central banks did not entail a radical further 
amendment to the view of lender of last resort over the non-systemic period, the main 
exception being the expanded role of the US Federal Reserve as “market maker or investor of 
last resort”. This in turn may link to the more securitised nature of the US financial system, 
and the more flexible central bank law in the US. 
 
Conclusion 
 
It is well known that liquidity risks are endemic to banks given the maturity transformation 
they undertake. The first line of defence should be appropriate liquidity policy on the asset 
and liability side, supported by adequate capital and robust supervision. Despite these, solvent 
banks can face liquidity difficulties at times of stress, necessitating liquidity support. As 
views have developed, the role of the LOLR is to avoid unnecessary failures, with suitable 
safeguards for central bank balance sheets and to minimise moral hazard. The role of LOLR 
in crisis periods is to prevent contagious panic by all means available – the central bank in 
such cases requires government support. LOLR must be a temporary policy with restructuring 
of distressed banks and corporate borrowers in the long term. 
 
The current crisis has shown that traditional models of banking risk and of LOLR require 
revision, as was already apparent to a lesser extent in the Russia/LTCM episode. Funding risk 
now interacts with market liquidity risk, to create difficult challenges for central banks. Runs 
must be envisaged in markets and not just banks, which given mark-to-market accounting, 
leads to threats to the liquidity and solvency of banks via changes in market prices, as well as 
threatening institutions that rely on market liquidity for funding or transactions purposes.  
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As a consequence, extensive changes to the traditional LOLR have been necessary, even 
during the period of the crisis which in retrospect was non-systemic, including: longer term 
funding provision with a variety of lower quality collateral; bringing investment banks into 
the safety net; and difficult challenges related to confidentiality of bank support and the 
interaction with deposit insurance. It is an important issue to investigate whether the net effect 
of these changes has been to increase moral hazard, the Achilles Heel of the safety net. 
 
In the systemic period the fiscal authorities stepped in extensively with recapitalisation and 
guarantees, taking over much of the safety net role from central banks. This is in line with 
past crises rather than being radical innovations. Equally, most central banks have expanded 
their liquidity provision but not adapted further from the innovations already introduced in the 
non systemic period. What has been more radical has been actions by the Fed to support new 
markets such as those for commercial paper as well as money market funds. 
 
The central banks face a challenge in terms of exit strategies from some of the measures that 
have been adopted for the crisis. As noted, their balance sheets have been vastly expanded by 
the liquidity assistance, which is seen by Bernanke (2008) as posing a risk for inflation in the 
long term.  It may also be crowding out the recovery of private sector lending (BIS 2008). 
They will also need to prevent moral hazard, for example, by retightening collateral regimes 
to avoid banks having long run incentives to hold less, low quality collateral. The interbank 
market needs to be reactivated, for example, by reducing term lending facilities when they are 
no longer needed, and rewidening central bank rate corridors to give banks incentives to lend 
to each other and not the central bank. The Economist (2008b) suggests that similar issues of 
generous LOLR holding back revival of publicly traded markets will arise for the European 
ABS market, that in mid 2008 consisted mainly of securities for collateral with the ECB.34 
These problems may have been intensified by the more generous support available after the 
crisis became systemic in the Autumn. 
 
Beyond the scope of this paper, there is a further challenge to develop regulation of bank 
liquidity so that the LOLR is not so essential in future episodes. This could involve a liquidity 
adjustment to value-at-risk estimates to incorporate maturity transformation, measurement of 
stock liquidity and appropriate market and funding liquidity stress tests (IMF 2008, Goodhart 
2007). A possible example is the new FSA policy announced in December 2008 (FSA 2008), 
which is likely to include a liquid assets buffer. The FSA assumes banks would be required to 
hold 6-10 per cent of assets in government bonds. There will also be individual quantitative 
liquidity adequacy standards (ILAS) for firms based on their being able to survive liquidity 
stresses of varying magnitude and duration. 
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